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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
LOUISE B. TAYLOR, et al,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
VIRGINIA CLARE JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
10316

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff, individually, and
as guardian of her minor children, asking damages
for the death of her husband, James W. Taylor,
who was killed while working between an automobile and a tra:iler stopped on the highway. The
ti·ailer was sitruck by an automobile driven by the
clefendan t.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This action was originally filed and tried in
Juab County, and a jury returned a verdict of "No
Cause of Action". On appeal to the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah, Taylor vs. Johnson, Case No.
9874, filed June 18, 1964, the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah remanded the case to the District
Court of Juab County for a new trial. The first
1

appeal is reported at 15 Utah 2d 342, 393 P2d 382.
Prior to the second trial, defendant filed a
Motion for Change of Venue, which was granted by
the District Court of Juab County, and the second
trial was in the District Court of Utah County.
At trial in Utah County, a jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and agains:t the
defendant, for $28,000.00. Judgment on the verdict
was entered November 10, 1964.
The defendant filed a timely Motion for J udgmen t Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative for New Trial. The Motion was denied January 6, 1965, by the Judge who tried the case, the
Honm·able Marcellus K. Snow of the District Court
of Salt Lake County.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant and defendant seeks to have the
Judgment on the Verdict set aside and a new trial
granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the Statement of Facts, references to the
transcript of testimony will be referred to as T.,
and references to the record, the pleadings, instructions, etc., will be referred to as R. The District
Court of Utah County did not consolidate the transcript of trial and the pleadings and other filed portions of the record into one record on appeal.
There is no dispute as to the time and place
2

of the accident. It happened June 13, 1961, about
9 :30 p.m., on Utah Highway U-28, approximately
9.3 miles south of Levan, Utah ('T. 60). It was a
dark moonless night. The highway was asphalt, 37
feet wide, with a broken center line (T. 105-Ex.
P.20). There were painted lines on each side of
the highway 2 feet 2 inches from the edge of the
hai•d surface ( T. 79). From the center line to the
east edge of the hardtop i't was 19 feet 2 inches,
and from the center line to the west edge of the
hardtop it was 17 feet 10 inches (T. 70).
About 9 :30 p.m., Don Milner, driving his Chevrolet north on Highway U-28, and pulling a homemade, two-wheel, single axle trailer ( T. 11), struck
a deer, damaging the right rear wheel housing, 'and
the car stopped on the highway, facing north (T.
15). The i'ight rear wheel left a tire mark on the
highway 158 feet 9 inches in length, extending south
from directly under the right rear wheel, and 8 feet
3 inches east of the center line (T. 101). It was
11 feet 1 inch from ~he east edge of the asph'alt
road to the right rear wheel of the Milner car (T.
101-Ex. P. 20). The investigating officer, Rex Hill,
observed the Milner vehicle on the highway and
the tire mark leading to the right rear whee'l ( T.
101-Ex. P. 20).
After stopping, Milner, with a flashlight, flagged down a car approaching from the south (T. 10),
a car driven by Everett Kester, ~ccompanied by
his wife children and his sister-in-law (T. 9) ·
'
3

Kester pulled ahead of the Milner car and stopped
200 'feet north (T. 10). A second car was flagged
and the occupants requested to notify a wrecker.
The wrecker artived at the accident scene in about
30 minutes (T. 16). The wrecker operator, James
Warner Taylor, approaching from the north, passed
by the accident scene, and drove off the west side
of the road and stopped at a clearing (T. 16). This
clearing, just south of the scene, was 'about 50 feet
in width (T. 110-Ex. P. 20). After the wrecker
arrived, the trailer was unhitched from the Milner
automobile, and moved to the east, and the wrecker
was then backed in to posi1tion directly behind the
Milner car (T. 17). Mr. Kester then backed his
car into position in front of the trailer. The trailer
lli'tch was taken off of fue Milner car, to be attached
to the Kester car ( T. 17). While the trailer hitch
was being attached to the Kester car, the wrecker
operator hooked the Milner car to the wrecker, and
the rear end of the Milner car lifted up (T. 20, 42).
1

After Taylor atta~hed the wrecker to the Milner car, he went to the area where the trailer was
being hitched to the Kester automobile, taking some
wren~hes to tighten the bolts (T. 20). The wrecker
was on the roadway just east of the center line,
facing south, with headlights on and two flashing
amber lights on the fenders, and a ro tating blue
light on top ('T. 18-19). The Milner trailer, with its
load, was higher than the rear of the Kester auto·
mobile ( T. 26). There were several fusees, reflec·
1
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torized stands, and three pot torches in the wrecker
but none were put out (T. 114), and at no time'
were any flares or Ian terns or signals placed on the
highway ( T. 26, 59).
The wrecker was not moved after being positioned behind the Milner car, and remained on the
highway facing south, with the headlights on (T.
27,51).
As the wrecker was stopped on the highway,
with the Milner car attached, the wrecker obscured
the tail lights of the Milner car (T. 20). The left
front door of the wrecker was open (T. 102, 103).
There was about three to four feet between 'the
Milne1· and Kester cars (T. 59).
After Taylor completed hooking the wrecker
onto the Milner car, he left the wrecker on the high'-'lay, and spent several minutes between the trailer
and the Kester vehicle, working on the trailer hitch
( T. 20). The trailer had electric liglrts, but they
\Vere not opel'ative after the trailer was unhitched
from Milner's car (T. 25).
The wrecker was south of the trailer, and as
the men worked on the trailer hitch, the tailights
on the Kester vehicle were obscured by the trailer
(T. 26). Fifteen to twenty minutes elapsed bebveen the time the wrecker arrived and the accident happened (T. 58).
Miss Virginia Johnson, the defendant, had
ch·iven from Provo to Richfield to visit a friend,
5

and she left Richfield after dark to return to Provo
(T. 170).
Just south of the accident scene she was traveling at a speed she estimated to be from 50 to 60
miles per hour. It was a dark night, with no moon
or other lights in the area (T. 170). She came
ai·ound a slight cm·ve, about one-half mile south
of the accident scene, and observed headlights and
the blue light on top of the wrecker (T. 172-177).
She saw no flares, or other warning signs and assumed the wrecker was moving toward her, and
on its own side of the road ( T. 63, 177). She testified she looked at her speedometer and was traveling 60 miles per hour, and took her foot from the
gas pedal. As she neared the wrecker, she observed
it to be partially in her lane of traffic and she had
to decide whether to try to stop abruptly, losing
control of her car, or attempt 'to go to the right of
the wrecker ( T. 1 73, 174). She drove to the right
of the wrecker and was blinded by the wrecker
lights, and applied brakes, but struck the rear of
the trailer, knocking it in to the Kester car ( T. 173).
Mrs. Kester testified that she observed the
Johnson car approaching and that it was traveling
80 to 85 miles per hour. Sgt. Edward Pitcher testified that in his opinion the Johnson vehicle was
traveling 73 miles per hour prior to the time brakes
were applied (T. 147).
There were several flashlights at the scene, and
6

before the accident Mrs. Kester had been going
south of the wrecker to wave the flashlight to warn
vehicles from the south (T. 23, 46, 54). Mrs. Kester
was between the Milner automobile and the Kester
automobile, when she saw the Johnson car approaching, bu't she did not get out in front of the wrecker
to warn Miss Johnson ('T. 45) . This was the only
vehicle from the south that had not been signalled
with a flashlight (T. 52).
Officer Rex Hill of the Utah Highway Patrol
investigated the accident and made measurements.
Atrhough the wrecker and Milner car were removed before he made his measurements, he had observed the wrecker on the road, facing south, in the
northbound lane of traffic (T. 64). He observed a
long tire mark on the highway running underneath
the right rear wheel of the Milner automobile (T.
124). This mark was 8 feet 3 inches east of the
center line ( T. 101) . He also observed other physical eviden'ce on the roadway, gouge marks, skid
marks (T. 73, 74, 76), and debris on the highway,
where the open door of the wrecker had been struck,
and paint knocked off, and he observed the damage to the wrecker door (T. 102).
1

Exhibit P. 20 received in evidence shows the
measurements made by the officer, the location of
the wrecker Milner automobile, and other physical
'
evidence.
Officer Hi'll found that the mark left by the
7

right rear wheel of the Milner automobile was 8
feet 3 inches east of the center line of the highway
( T. 101 ) . Tllis would leave 11 feet 1 inch of hardtop surface of the highway eas't of the Milner automobile and the wrecker, as they were stopped on
the highway ( T. 101) . The Milner car and the
wrecker occupied 8 feet 3 inches of the e'ast side
of the highway, and there was four feet between
the Milner car and the Kester car. The Kester car
and trailer occupied the remaining 7 fee't of the
highway (Exhibit 20).
As to the probable point of impact, the police
officer testified it was indicated by gouge marks
and tire marks on the highway (T. 73), and that
'the Kester car and trailer came to rest 76 feet 4
inches north of the point of the gouge. The gouge
marks were on the hard-surfaced portion of the
highway, 'and were 4 feet 7 inches apart (T. 73).
One gouge was 6 feet west of the east edge of the
highway, and the other, one foot 5 inches west of
the east edge (T. 105).
For the use of the Court, and to illustrate the
testimony of the investigating police officer, Appendix A is a diagram of the accident scene, show·
ing· the measurements made by the officer, and the
po~i'tion of the vehicles as the scene was set, with
the wrecker facing south with the headlights on,
the trailer behind the headlights, where it was be·
ing attached to the Kester vehicle and the east half
8

of the highway blocked. Measurements on the illustrative diagram are the same as Exhibit P. 20.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT E'RRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WHICH TOOK FROM THE JURY THE
ISSUE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFFS' DECEDENT,
IN THE EVENT OF A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT
SAW AND KNEW THE WRECKER TO BE UPON THE
HIGHWAY IN SUFFICIENT TJiME TO HAVE REASONABLY AVOIDED THE ACCIDENT.

This case was previously heard on appeal by
the pl'aintiffs from an adverse judgment. Opinion
was rendered in Louise B. Taylor, et al, vs. Virginia
Clare Johnson, 15 Utah 2d 342, 347, 348, 393, P2d
382 ( 1964). After reviewing the factual background of the case in detail, this Court ma!de some
pertinent observations concerning the conduct of
defendant and of plaintiffs' decedent at the time of
the accident as it relates to proximate cause.
A reasonable basis for the decision in Miss
Johnson's favor was acknowledged by this Court,
although it was reversed on other grounds. A directed verdict against her was specifically rejected, and
the question of her negligent conduct was reserved
for the jury. The Court then detailed the conduct
of Mr. Taylor immediately preceding the accident
and concluded:
"But even if all these precautions were taken,
9

the qu~stion of ~vhether Tayl01· was guilty
?f negl~gence which proximately contributed
rn causmg the accident is a jury question."
The following language, taken from the opinion, was intended for the guidance of the Court
on retrial:
"The instructions contain no direct concise
statement of the main determinative issues
of fact in the case. Such issues were: (a)
\Vhether Miss Johnson's negligence proximately caused the accident by continuing to
drive for a full half mile at an unreasonably
high and dangerous rate of spe€d, all 'the time
knowing she was approaching a wrecker on
the road but was unable to determine whether
it was moving or stopped, or whether there
were other vehicles stopped on the road in that
neighborhood, until it was too late to avoid
the accident. (b) \Vhether Taylor by contributory negligence proximately caused the accident by failing to place flares on the road
or iwovide other warnings of the hazardous
situation to approaching 'traffic. Such a stat€men t of the issues in ordinary language not
ove1·bm·dened with legal terminology would
have greatly clarified the jury's problems.
Over the vigorous and detailed objection by defendant's counsel, (Tr. 183), the trial court gave
the follovving Instruction to the jury:
"Instruction No. 9"
"You are instructed that a wrecker operator
in darkness has the duty to reasonably warn
approaching traffic of the C1bstruction on the
roadway by displaying lights, flares, or other
10

prac_tical means, and failure to do so, may be
negligence.
You are further instructed however fuat
if the defendant in this case sC:.w the wr~cker
and knew it to be a wrecker, in sufficient time
to h?-ve reasonably avoided the collision, any
negl_igen~e of. ~ames 'Yarner Taylor, if you
so fmd, m ~ailmg to. display lights, flares, or
other practical warnmg devices, would not be
a contributing proximate cause of his death,
and the defense of contributory negligence
would not defeat plaintiffs' recovery." (R.
27).
The Instruction given violated the plain and
precise rule of the case as set out in the opinion of
this Court on the previous appeal, that the questions of negligence and proximate cause of each
party be specifically reserved for jury consideration.
Instruction No. 9 advised the jury that if they
found that the defendant "s aw the wrecker and
knew it to be a wrecker, in sufficient time to have
reasonably avoided the accident", any negligence
of Taylor was not a proximate cause and wouM not
defeat plaintiffs' recovery.
1

Not only did the trial court take from the jury
the question of proximate cause of Taylor's negligence, it prohibited the jury from considering all of
the facts and circumstances which would properly
bear upon the question of whether Miss Johnso~'s
conduct was negligent or non-negligent. The trial
11

court, by its instruction, advised the jury that if
she saw and knew the vehicle on the highway to be
a wrecker in sufficient time to have reasonably
avoided the collision, that such conduct was the
sole proximate cause and eliminated the consi'deration of other facts or circumstances which may have
affected the reasonableness of her conduct, including that of Taylor.
This Court m its prev10us opm10n considered
this very issue :
"Until just before the accident, by her own
admission Miss Johnson was exceeding the
posted and statutory speed limit. This is so,
even though she recognized that there was a
wrecker on the highway. She makes no claim
that she reduced her speed at any time before the collision slower than 50 miles per
hour, the maximum speed limit, although a
wrecker on the highway at night definitely
should suggest to approaching traffic that
there exists special hazards requiring a slower speed. However, what a reasonably priident
person would do 1inder the existing circum·
stances is a question for the jury to ~eter·
mine and we can only hold a party guilty of
negligence as a matter of law where it is con·
elusively shown that the course pursued was
not that of a reasonably pru~ent pers.on. We
therefore cannot direct a verdict on this ques·
ti on against Miss Johnson." (Emphasis add·
ed).
Thus, on retrial, the question of Miss John·
son's conduct was to be reserved for jury con'sidera·
12

tion and was to be measured against the familiar
standard of "what a reasona:bly prudent person
would do under existing circumstances". The trial
court in effect took this question from the jury by
limiting their consideration to only some of the
circumstances, and ruling as a matter of law such
conduct was not only negligent, hut was the sole
proximate cause of the accident.
This Court has repeatedly held that the question of proximate cause of an actor's negligence,
even where the violation of a statute is 'involved, is
ordinarily a jury question.
1

Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P2 d 191;
Gibbs v. Bfaie Cab, 122 Utah 312, 249 P2d 213, on
rehearing, 123 Utah 281, 259 P2d 294; Jensen v.
Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 271 P2d 838; Hayden v.
Cedarlund, 263 P2d 796, 1 Utah 2d 171; Thompson
v. Ford Motor Company, 395 P2d 62, (Utah 1965).
1

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN .AICCORDANCE WITH THE
DEFENDA.NT'S THEORY OF THE CASE.

The only instruction given by the Court as to
duty of the decedent, J ames Warner Taylor, to place
warning signals or flares to warn approaching traffic of the hazardous situation was in Instruction
No. 9 ( R. 27) . In the same Instruction, the Court
instructed the jury that if the defendant, Virginia
Clare Johnson, saw the wrecker on the highway and
1
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knew it to be a wrecker that any contributory negligence of Taylor would not be a proximate cause of
the accident.
It is defendant's right to have the jury instructed upon her theory of the case. Exception to
the Instructions as a whole, in failing to submit the
defendant's theory of the claim of negligence of the
deceased, James Warner Taylor, was made by counsel at the time of trial (T. 185, 186).

In the previous decision, the Court remanded
the case for a new trial with specific directions as
to the issues for trial, and set for th the issue as
to the contributory negligence of James Warner
Taylor, and stated:
"The instructions contain no direct concise
statement of the main determinative issues of
fact in the case. Such issues were: (a) * * *
(b) \Vhether Taylor by contributory neg!i·
gence proximately caused the acciden'~ by failing to place flares on the road or provide other
warnings of the hazardous situation to approaching traffic. * * *"
Defendant requested instructions in accordance
with the theory of negligence on the part of James
Warner Taylor and in accordance with the Court's
previous decision ( R. 60). The failure of the Court
to instruct the jury in accordance with the defendant's theory of the case was error and prejudicial
to defendant.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY CONCERNING THE PRESUMPTION OF
DUE CARE ON THE PART OF THE DECEASED
TAYLOR.
'

The Trial Judge instructed the jury, in Instruction No. 10 (R. 28), as follows:
"Based upon the commonly known fact that
the instinct for self preservation is such that
persons use ordinary care for their own safety, the law permits you to assume that the
deceased, at the time of and immediately
preceding the incident in question, was exercising due cat'e for his own safety. And you
may make findings in accordance therewith,
unless you are persuaded from a preponderance of the evidence that he was guilty of contributory negligence as elsewhere in these instructions defined." (Emphasis ours).
Exception was duly taken to Instruction No.
10 (T. 184).
In the case of llf echam v. Allen, 1 Ut:ah 2nd 79,
262 P2d 285, the Court stated:
"The Court erred in giving instruction
No. 11 set out below, on the presumption that
deceased used due care for his own safety.
'You are instructed that, until the contrary is
proven, there is a presumption that the 4eceased Thomas Udell Mecham, was exercising due and proper care for .the pro~ect~on of
his person and the preservat~o!1 of his hie,. at
the time of the accident; this presumpt~on
a1·ises from the instinct for self-preservation
15

and the ~isposition o! man to avoid personal
~arm. This presump~10n is not conclusive, but
is a ?late~ to be considered by the jury in con!1ect10n with all other facts and circumstances
m the case in determining whether or not the
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence at the time of the accident.'
From the basic fact that a human being
was accidentally killed a presumption arises
which requires the trier of facts to assume the
presumed facts that decedent used due care
for his own safety, in the absence of a prima
facie showing to the contrary, but in this kind
of a presumption upon the making of such a
showing, the presumption disappears from
and becomes wholly inoperative in the case,
and the trial from then on should proceed
exactly the same as though no presumption
ever existed, or had any effect on the case."
The evidence at trial of this case was uncontradicted that the decedent, James W. Taylor, arrived
at the scene of the accident, drove to the west side
of the road, walked over and looked at the scene,
drove back to the center of the road and placed his
wrecker in position, facing south, with the headlights on, and spent fifteen to twenty minutes working at the scene. He then commenced working on
the trailer which was behind the headlights of the
wrecker, with no tailights visible to defendant, and
remained in this position until the defendants passed
to the right of the wrecker, hitting the trailer. Tay·
lor had fusees, reflectorized stands, and pot flares
in his wrecker, but none were ever put out to warn
16

the approaching vehicles. The defendant drew the
evidence of Mr. Taylor's conduct as set forth, from
the plaintiffs' own witnesses. This evidence of conduct contrary to the exercise of due care for his
own safety then caused the presumption of due care
to become wholly inoperative in the case.
In the Mecham v. Allen case, it was held:
"Since defendant's evidence was clearly sufficient to make a prima facie case, that decedent was guilty of contributory negligence
which pi·oximately caused the accident, the
presumption w~.s eliminated from the case
and it was e1Tor for the court to instruct the
jury on that question."
Appellant urges that the instruction given
by the trial court is prejudicially erroneous in that
the instruction, as given, told the jury that they
could assume that the deceased at the time of the
accident was exercising due care for his own safety,
and told the jury that the presumption had evidentiary value. The Court wrongfully instructed the
jury as to the effect of the presumption, where, in
fact, the presumption was taken from this case by
evidence showing the lack of due care on the part
of the deceased.
As stated in the Mecham v. Allen case:

"* * * for a presump~ion which dea~~ only
with the burden of gomg forward with the
evidence as long as it is effective ir_i t~e .case
is conclusive. This does not mean It IS Ir~e
buttable for it is completely rebutted and dis17

appears fi:om ~he case upon the production of
prima facie evidenc~ to the contrary. It is for
the Court to determme whether a prima facie
c~se has been ~ade, not for the jury to con.
sider and to weigh the presumption along with
other evidence."
The error in the instruction is th'at it allows
the jury to consider and weigh the presumption a'long
with the other evidence in the case. It advises the
jury that they may make findings in accordance
with the presumption.
Appellant contends that the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial, under the facts and circumstances of this case, because any effect of such
a presumption disappeared from the case following evidence rebutting it.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE
AS TO THE COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION OR "DRAG
FACTOR" OF THE ROADWAY AT THE PLA CE--THE
ACCIDENT OOOURRED.
1

There is a difference of opinion among the
Courts as to what elements of fact are necessary in
order to determine the coefficient of friction, or
"drag factor" of a given surface. In some Courts,
details concerning the weight of the vehicle, the size
and type of tires, the depth of tread, the width of
tires, the air temperature and the melting point of
the tires are all factors to be taken in to consideration. This Court has, at least tacitly, given its ap18

proval to a "Rule of Thumb" chart published by the
Utah Highway Patrol wherein three of these variables, to-wit: (1) skidding distance; (2) coefficient of friction; and ( 3) speed, are set forth, the
purpose of which is to compute any one of the three
variables which is unknown from two variables
which are known. (See Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah
2d 392, 284 P2d/115; Peterson v. Nielsen, 9 Utah
2d 302, 343 P2d 731).
It was the testimony of Officers Hill and Sherwood at trial that as a part of their investigation
in this matter, they attempted to determine the coefficient of friction of the highway on which the
accident occurred, by the use of 'a "nomograph" or
"calculator", and which was admitted in evidence
as plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 11. Officer Hill testified
that two tests to determine coefficient of friction
were made the morning after the accident and that
a third one was made two or three days later (T.
80.) The method used was described by Officer
Hill as follows:
"We drove our car down the road thirty miles
an hour and violently applied the brakes. Then
you measure the skid marks left by all four
wheels divide by four and use the calculator
which 'we were furnished" ( T. 81).
Officer Sherwood, in his testimony, stated essentially the same thing as Officer Hill, with the exception that he did not mention the speed of the vehicle (T. 127).
19

Even if we omit all of the other factors which
may be necessary to arrive at a correct coefficient
of friction and agree that only those three factors
used on the nomograph (Exhibit 11), are necessary
in order to arrive at that figure, it is clear that in
order to arrive at the coefficient of friction of any
given surface, the speed of the vehicle and the length
of the skid marks made by that vehicle stopping on
the surf ace involved must be known in order to
arrive at the unknown coefficient of friction. In
this connection, neither Officer Hill nor Officer
Sherwood testified concerning the length of any
skid ma1·ks made by them in conducting these tests.
The only information given is Officer Hill's statement that "\Ve drove our car clown the road thirty
miles an hour".
Counsel for the plaintiffs objected to the testimony of these officers as to coefficient of friction,
basing this objection, among other things, on the
fact that the1·e was "No evidence as to the measurements of any marks that he inay h ave ma de .. ·"
( T. 89). This objection was oYerruled.
Likewise it is axiomatic that in making tests
of this kind, in m·der to determine the coefficient of
friction en a given sm·face, and then applying that
coefficient to determine the unknown speed o~ a
vehicle involved in a collision, the surface being
tested must be in approximately the same condit~on
at the time the test is made as when the collision
20

occurred. Traffic Accident Investigator's Manual
for Police, The Traffic Institute, Northwestern University, 1957 edition, P. 306. In this connection,
neither Officer Hill nor Officer Sherwood gave any
testimony whatever with respect to that factor. For
all that the record reveals, there may have been an
intervening rainstorm, resulting in a damp highway surface; or, for that matter, the test may have
been conducted during a rainstorm.
The 1'ack of these two vital factors in the plaintiffs' evidence, i.e., the length of the marks, if any,
made during the skid test and the failure to esta:blish a similarity of road conditions at the time of
the accident and at the time the tests were made
should nullify the testimony of Officers Hill 1and
Sherwood as to the coefficient of friction of the highway on which the accident occurred. The objection
as to the admissability of this testimony should have
been sustained, and it is the contention of defendant
that the Court erred in admitting this testimony.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE OPINION EVIDEJNCE OF A POLICE OFFICER AS TO
THE SPEED OF THE JOHNSON VEHICLE.

It is the contention of Appellant that the Court
erred in allowing the witness Pitcher to testify, as
an expert witness, concerning the speed of the Johnson vehicle, based upon the facts set forth in a cer21

tain hypothetical question put by plaintiffs' counsel.
Assuming that this Court has given judicial approval to the nomograph used by the Highway Patrol
and introduced in this ·action as Exhibit 11, we have
no doubt tha:t 'anyone familiar with the use of mathematical formulae and tables, could take three known
factors of skidding distance, coefficient of friction,
and the grade of the highway, and by the use of said
graph or the formula upon which it is based, compute
the probable speed. The formula which Officer Pitcher said that he used (T. 148) is the same formula as
that used in the nomograph, with the exception of
an allowance for the grade of the highway. (See
Exhibit 11)
If, however, factors other than ski'dding dis·
tance, coefficient of friction and grade are needed
in order to determine speed, then it becomes clear
that the witness Pitcher was not qualified. From
the testimony of the witness, it was clear that he
held no college degrees, and was ndt a physicist nor
an engineer. Earlier in the trial, the Court had ex·
pressed his feelings with respect to speed estimates
based on evidence other than skidding distance and
coefficient of friction ( T. 91 ) .
It is apparent that the witness himself recog·
nized this problem, for throughout his testimony on
cross-examinaJtion, it became very clear that he was
aittempting to convince the court and ~he jury that
he did not use any factors in computmg the speed
22

of the Johnson vehicle except coeficient of friction
and the skidding distance of the Johnson vehicle
(T. 148-151). Even plaintiffs' attorney, in qualifying his hypothetical question, appears to have
recognized the limitations of Officer Pitcher's expertise (T. 146).
Yet, despite the advocacy of the witness, after
stating twice that the formula he used involved only
skidding distance and coefficient of friction to determine speed ( T. 148), he arrived at an answer
which obviously went beyond anything stated in the
hypotheti'cal question-an answer which was at once
prejudicial to the defendant and inflammatory in its
effect on the jury.
The formula which the witness says he used (T.
148) may be expressed mathematically as follows:
Speed

=

5.5

x

\I

skid distance X coefficient
of friction

Using the figures given in the hypothetical question,
as corroborated by the witness, "distance" in the
formula above is 11 feet 10 inches plus 56112 feet,
a total of 68 feet 4 inches (T. 148). "Coefficient
of friction" is .74 (T. 145). By substituting those
figures for the symbols in the above formula, the
problem would be expressed mathematically as follows:
Speed = 5.5 X

\I

68.33 X .74

By simple mathematics, using these figures, or
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by the use of Exhibit 11, which uses the same for.
mula, it may be determined that "speed" is equal
to approximately 39 miles per hour. The witness
Pitcher, ostensibly using this same formula and these
same figures, told the jury that the defendant's vehicle was going 73 miles per hour. The effect of
this testimony on the jury certainly speaks for itself.
Later, when Officer Pitcher was called as a
witness by defendant, for the purpose of propounding a proper hypothetical question, he stated that
in making his former computation, "Yes, I did
use damage involved" ( T. 162) . Th us, by his own
testimony, he admitted going beyond the facts given
in the hypothetical question. The original hypo·
thetical question propounded by counsel for plain·
tiffs is completely devoid of any reference to dam·
age ( T. 145). The record is silent as to what "dam·
age" the witness was using in making his computa·
tions, or the source of his information. Having ori·
ginally been so emphatic in his assertion tha:t he
used only the facts given in the hypothetical, his
self-contradiction is obvious and the answer he gave
should have been stricken on defendant's motion.
In addition to the foregoing, the opinion of the
witness was based, at least in part, on the informa·
tion given him as to the coefficient of friction of the
24

sul'face of the roadway. If defendant's contention
in Point Four is well taken, that is, the Court erred
in admitting the testimony concerning coefficient
of friction, then the use of that figure in any subsequent computations would nullify the validity of
such subsequent computations.
A caveat has recently been expressed by this
Court with respect to the expert witness, as follows:
"In view of the importance of the function
entrusted to the expeI't witness, it is of great
importance that the Court carefully scrutinize
his qualificatioils to guard against being led
astray by the pseudo learned or charlatan who
may purvey erroneous or too positive opinions
without sound foundation." Webb v. Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 9 Utah 2d
275, 342 P2d 1094.
Defendant respectfully contends that the trial
com't, in the case at bar, particularly in view of
the above quoted language, should have exduded the
testimony of the witness Pitcher.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully contends tha!t the prejudicially erroneous instructions given by the trial
court and the ommision of instruction upon the de25

fendant's theory of the case together with the admission of evidence clearly erroneous and prejudicial relating as to speed and coefficient of friction
constitute reversible error and a new trial should
be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN,
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.,
909 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah, and
CHRISTENSEN, PAULSON &
TAYLOR,
Ford R. Paulson,
55 East Center Street,
Provo, U ta:h,
Attorneys for
Defendant and Appell,ant
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